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ResDonse to Comments
DANIEL E. BASSUK
I should like to thank my critics for giving me a thorough
reading. I in turn have a profound respect for John Yungblut
and greatly treasure the year we spent together.
The difficulty I have with Yungblut's critique is his refusal
to acknowledge the distinctions that I and others have tried
to point out. The counsel given by Rufus Jones to Yungblut,
"If you seek reality in religion, read the mystics," is clever
advice. However, what did Jones mean by the word "reality"?
Did he mean by "reality" a direct and firsthand spiritual
experience, or the Reality of the universe? This distinction is
essential and corresponds to my distinction between "mystical"
and "mysticism," which Jones adhered to in 1917. Slurring
over this difference led Jones to be divided in his feelings
toward Plotinus and Eckhart, as my essay points out; Yungblut's response is to sing of paradoxology. And "read the
mystics" is good advice until one finds them disagreeing among
themselves (e.g., Fox and Norris, Jones and Eckhart). Then
what happens to the search for "reality in religion"?
As for the minor points, first allow me to point out that
the word "egregious," which my critic stumbled over, was in a
quotation of our editor. I chose to use it to illustrate that I
am not alone in observing the ambiguity into which Rufus
Jones has led us.
Second, Yungblut places Jones in the good company of
Underhill, Herman, Inge, von Hugel, James, Otto, and Stace,
on mystical experience. But upon closer inspection he should
see that Otto and Stace moved out from Jones and James and
with delight dealt with the metaphysical realm of mysticism as
experienced by Eckhart, Shankara, and Plotinus, while Jones
cringed over it.

Ultimate Reality? For Rufus Jones, mysticism in this sense is
to be rejected. He finds it completely out of touch with reality and with his age, and does all that he can to uproot and
destroy it. Jones exhibits a preference for an experiential
mystical event which is concrete and vital and leads to positive
action. A philosophical approach such as that of Heiler,
which Ieads to a Platonic ideal or a Plotinian oneness, is too
abstract and non-pragmatic for Jones. Jones conceives of the
Inner Light as somethng which can be experienced in the hush
and silence of the Quaker meeting for worship. It leads one
to an active concern for one's fellow beings. Jones actually
knew the reality of this experience in his own life.
11. JONES AND T H E QUAKERS

A. JONES AND GEORGE FOX

In this section I will investigate how Rufus Jones anived
at the belief that Quakerism was mystical. In his "Introduction" to the historical study, The Beginning3 of Quakerism,
Jones states that "Quakerism, as a type of Christianity, is
deeply mystical and also deeply pr~phetical."'~ He says this
in connection with his discussion of the founder of Quakerism,
George Fox. There is no doubt that his concept of a mystical
Quakerism stems from his view of Fox.
Rufus Jones wrote three books on George Fox and published an abridged version of Fox's Journal in 1903, titled
George Fox, An Autobiography. He wrote many chapters in
his books and in articles for journals, and delivered numerous
addresses, on Fox. Jones believes that Fox took his place in
religious history among the spiritual reformers of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, among men like Denck, Franck,
Schwenckfeld, Castellio, and Boehme, and that these reformers
"were in sympathy with the mystic's type of religi~n."'~By
"sympathy" Jones means that they held to the mystical doctrine that the divine Seed or Inward Light was the essential
nexus between God and man. From 1903 until just shortly
before his death in 1948, a period of forty-five years, Rufus
Jones was espousing the belief that Fox had said that "there
is something of God, which may be called a divine seed or a

severe reduction of self-importance," since "egoism is an
undoubted hindrance." But for Jones, the effort at complete
self-naughting means "that you cease to be a person at all,"
and this he takes to be against the divine purpose.lg
Jones took issue not only with Huxley but with the
German scholar Friedrich Heiler. In 1936 Rufus Jones disagreed with Heiler's concept of mysticism, saying.

..

Friedrich Heiler, . in his definition of mysticism,
has pushed the negative aspect of it to its farthest
limits. He defines mysticism as "that form of communion with God in which the world and the self
are radically negated, in which the human personality is dissolved, submerged and engulfed in the
infinite one-ness of Divinity."
Here, I am convinced, a metaphysical theory is
voicing itself, not an experience. Mysticism has
taken this form because it is dominated by a
metaphysical theory. My contention always has
been, and still is, that this particular way of
approach was determined by a prevailing type of
philosophical outlook, and is in no real sense
essential to genuine mystical experience."
It can be observed that Rufus Jones dispenses with Heiler, as
with Huxley, in terms of his own preference for mystical experience rather than for the metaphysical doctrine of mysticism.
It is ironic that both Heiler and Jones cite Archbishop
Nathan Soderblom as their source for the idea of dividing up
mysticism into two distinguishable types. From Soderblom's
division of mysticism into the mysticism of infinity and the
mysticism of personality, Heiler derives his distinction between
mysticism and the prophetic, while Jones comes away with the
concepts of negation mysticism and affirmation mysticism."
Sijderblom's mysticism of personality is the source of both
Heiler's "prophetic consciousness" and Jones's ''affirmation mysticism," and the two are similar in being biblical, ethical,
personalistic, action and service oriented, and concerned with
historical time.
What has become of "mysticism" as understood in the
sense of the German Mystik, the metaphysical doctrine of the
relationship and potential union of the human soul with

Finally, I heartily agree with Yungblut that the synchro.
nicity of mystical experience does have relevance. But so does
mysticism, which Jones so disliked and tried so hard to extirpate.
In response to J. Floyd Moore, I can only say that I have
indeed read all the literature he has cited, and more (pardon
the pun), and that at the editor's discretion my analysis of Alsobrook, Moore, and Dwyer was deleted for lack of space. Since
he asks me what I think of Alsobrook's analysis, let me say
that Alsobrook's dissertation is primarily an analysis and that
the critical evaluation he offered was based mainly on the
works of Barth, Brunner, Berdyaev, and Kierkegaard. The
fault with this dissertation lies in the contrast between the
Quaker views of Jones and the views of the aforementioned
neeorthodox theologians, who are in a tradition totally at
odds with Jones's liberal theology. The critical evaluation
would have been more pertinent had it been based upon
sources from within Jones's own Quaker tradition, rather than
from a totally foreign one.
I find it revealing to see Moore referring to Quakerism as
a "liberating spiritual movement which can find a meeting
place of the divine with all humanity." His view, that Quakerism "has much to l e a n from Buddha, Laetzu, Shankara, the
Sufis, Gandhi, and the empiricism of native African religion,"
shows me that Moore is expressing an attitude which combines
two main lines of interpreting Quakerism today: as mystical
Quakerism and as liberal Quakerism. For the exponent of
the liberal interpretation of Quakerism,
Quakerism means freedom to roam all over the
religious map, and he values his liberty to do
this and enjoys observing his fellow Quakers roaming freely about, even though they may be moving
in directions very different from the direction in
which he is moving himself. For many such the
Society is primarily a refuge for those who want
freedom to follow their own individual bent in
an atmosphere that is mildly religious and fiercely
tolerant. They see the Society of Friends as one of
the liberal denominations and feel a certain kinship with other liberal den0minations.l

Moore also presents us with the mystical interpretation of
Quakerism. According to this view,
Quakerism is one of many outcroppings of mystical religion that have occurred from time to time
in Christian history. In support of this view an
attempt has been made to trace the spiritual ancestry of the Quakers through a long chain of Christian mystics. The Quakers are represented as one
of the links in this chain. . . . Quakers of the mystical type.. . begin to think of their faith as the
Christian version of mystical religion and to claim
a spiritual kinship with mystics belongjng to nonChristian traditions. In fact, some Friends maintain that the special historical task of the Quakers
is to be that Christian denomination that embodies
the spirit of Christian mysticism and thereby serves
as a bridqe between Christianity and the mystical
element in other religions. . . There is a universalism that belongs to mystical Quakerism but it
is not the universalism of the Christian faith. It
is the universalism of mysticism. For the mystic,
Christianity is one particular manifestation in history of an "eternal gospel" whose truth is not
dependent on any historical events?
I fully agree with Moore that Rufus Jones did point us
in these directions. But what is left unanswered is why Jones
had so much trouble with the type of mysticism exemplified in
Buddha, Lao-tzu, and Shankara. I should like to ask Moore
if he is ready to accept these so-called life-negating mystics, who
describe the Godhead as Neti, Neti, into his ethical, rational,
social Quakerism?
It is beyond my ken to deal with "the future of the Society
of Friends in the world community." My perspective is
religious studies, with special attention to mysticism and the
mystical. I am concerned with the analysis of Jones and with
looking carefully at the way in which he changed Quakerism
from within. Even if Rufus Jones was pointing us in the
direction of the future world commuunity, should that prevent
us from subjecting him to a scholarly analysis? We should
have nothing to fear, for Quakerism will undoubtedly survive
in the world community regardless of our theological debate.

.

,.
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him: "Mysticism is an immediate, intuitive, experimental
knowledge of God, or one may say it is consciousness of a
Beyond, or of transcendent Reality, or of Divine Presence.'"'
What Jones is saying in all of his definitions of mysticism,
including this one, is that mysticism is for him a psychological
matter made up of experiential and non-rational experiences.
Nowhere but in the ERE does he hold to the distinction made
there that mysticisnl is a metaphysical doctrine and is distinct
from the mystical, which is psychological.
It is quite evident that, although R u h s Jones made the
distinction between mysticism and mystical experience in the
ERE, he decided not to follow it. This is indicated by those
two books in which "mysticism" appears in the title and by the
feelings expressed in his remark that "I am not interested in
mysticism as an ism. It turns out in most accounts to be a
dry and abstract thing.. . . It is mystical experience and not
mysticism that is worthy of our study."ll
The individual mystics and groups of mystics for whom
Jones shows most appreciation in his historical studies George Fox, St. Paul, the Spiritual Reformers, the Seekers,
the Friends of God, and "some exponents of mystical religion"
- are all interpreted to be mystical rather than involved with
the metaphysical doctrine of mysticism. When he is confronted with mysticism understood in its metaphysical sense,
he disagrees and is ready to dispute it. For example, when
Jones read Aldous Huxley's Grey Eminence (1941) he disagreed with Huxley's understanding of mysticism: "Aldous
Huxley in that remarkable book, Grey Eminence, raises the
question, 'Why shouldn't Mysticism die out?' as he thinks (I
believe wrongly) that it seemed likely to do at the end of the
seventeenth century."lz The reason for the disagreement about
mysticism is that Jones is thinking of it in a psychological
sense, while Huxley was thinking of it in a metaphysical sense.
And in 1945, when Huxley published The Perennial Philosophy, an anthology of mysticism which emphasized negating
the self, Jones explicitly took issue with Huxley. In The
Luminous Trail (1947) Jones objects that the perennial philosophy was presented solely as a via negativa. He concedes
"that there is an element of truth in this insistence on the

In this article Rufus Jones clearly makes the distinction between
mysticism and the mystical. However, in 1936 Jones was to
modify his earlier understanding of Mystik, writing that "the
German language has two words where we have but one. I t
uses 'Mysticismus' for the occult and the abnormal, and 'Mystik'
for the theory of life that God and man are akin and in recip
rocal relationship."' Elsewhere he understands the nature of
mysticism to be grounded in "Greek rationalistic metaphysics"
and tells us that "the Platonic stream of life and thought is
beyond question the greatest single source of European mysti~ism."~
He also realizes that "this intellectual formulation
and it is the metaphysics underlying historical mysticism
necessarily involves a via negativa.'."'
Of Jones's fifty-four Books, only two have the w r d "mysticism" in the title: The F1owerin.g of Mysticism: T h e Friends
of God in the Fourteenth Century j1939), and Mysticism and
Democracy in the English Commonwealth (1932). Since he
does not use the word mysticism in the precise way in which
he defined it in the ERE anywhere else in his writings, let us
look at these two books to see how Jones means it to be
understood.
In Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealtlz Jones starts out by saying:

-

I have always used the word mysticism with a
much wider meaning, and shall continue to d o so.
The essential feature of a mystical experience as I
view it is not the negative path of approach nor
the special scale of ladder-steps upward, nor the
empty-handed, or niwana, state in which the
experience culminates. Its essential aspect is
rather the conviction of certainty that the person's
own soul has found its goal of reality in God?
Jones makes it clear in this book that he is concerned with the
affirmation mystics rather than the negative ones, and sees no
reason for denying an extension of meaning to the word mysticism. This indicates an unwillingness on Jones's part to
abide by his earlier definition in the ERE.
In the book T h e Flowering of Mysticism Jones gives one
of his many famous definitions of what mysticism means for

.
I)

T o my dear mentor, Lewis Benson, I can only say that
once again I find his inner light radiant, clear, and glowing.
The way he reads me is the way I would like everyone to
understand what I am trying to convey. I agree with his point
that metaphysical mysticism does not exclude experience and
that Jones's own particular form of mystical experience, affirmative mysticism, does not exclude metaphysics. However, I
feel that he and I would agree that it is too simple to just slur
over the differences between mystical experience and metaphysical mysticism, as Jones would do.
Both Lewis Benson and John Yungblut criticize me for
not making a true analogy between Benson's categories of
prophetic and philosophical Quakerism, and experiential and
metaphysical mysticism. Allow me to clarify this. First of all,
I was not trying to say that they are identical. I merely said
that the two traditions are analogous to the categories of
mystical and mysticism. I wholly agree that Jones's affirmation
mysticism is vastly different from Benson's prophetic Quakerism, which is grounded in the biblical tradition. Affirmation
mysticism is a mixed breed, combining the Hebraic with the
Hellenistic. In this essay I have attempted to draw out the distinction between the mystical and mysticism. In order not to
overly complicate matters, I have ignored a third religious mode,
the prophetic. As I see it, in Prophetic Quakerism Benson
is dealing with the prophetic mode and contrasting it with the
mode of metaphysical mysticism, which he calls "philosophical." On the other hand, I am dealing with the experientialmystical mode and the mode of metaphysical mysticism.
The mode to which Jones's affirmation mysticism belongs is
experiential-mystical - neither Benson's prophetic nor my
metaphysical mysticism, but rather a hybrid which falls somewhere between the two. Jones's affirmation mysticism helped
to create the contemporary trend of mystical Quakers who refer
to the Inner Light and that of God in such a way as to fit
them in with today's dabblings with consciousness-raising,
nature and aesthetic "highs," spiritual experiences, peakexperiences, and psychedelic and visionary experiences. This
is where Rufus Jones has led contemporary Quakerism. It is
for me, as I believe it is for Lewis Benson, a mild and passive

form of religion which lacks the power, strength, and vigor
felt by the early Quakers. I well understand his anguish and
his call for the revitalization within Quakerism of the historymaking quality that once existed. May we all be guided by
the Light that enlightens the world.
1. Lewis Benson, Catholic Quakerism: A Vision for All Men (Philadelphia: Book 8c Publications Committee. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of
the Religious Society of Friends, 1968). pp. 4-5.

2 Ibid., pp. 1-4.

of Benson specifically pointed to Rufus Jones as the modern
interpreter of the mystical mode of the Quaker tradition.'
In 1946, Geoffrey F. Nuttall published his scholarly study,
T h e Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience? In presenting early Quakerism in its immediate historical context, Nuttall
brought out the lack of any influence by Jacob Boehme and the
Cambridge Platonists upon George Fox, despite the assertion
by Rufus Jones that they had had a ' major influence. Nuttall
demonstrated that early Quakerism was an outgrowth of radical
Puritanism rather than of the mystical movements of the
continent. He noted that the Spiritual Reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries preceded Puritanism and in
some cases anticipated the radical Puritanism of the Quakers,
but that their influence, if any, was indirect.
In spite of these studies of Fox which were at variance
with Rufus Jones's interpretation of Fox, no adequate critique
has yet been attempted of Jones and his affirmation mysticism.
The following is an attempt in this direction.
I. JONES ON THE "MYSTICAL" AND "MYSTICISM"

In the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (henceforth
abbreviated ERE), Rufus Jones wrote the introductory article
on "Mysticism" in 1917: In it he makes the following important distinction:
The word 'mysticism' has, furthermore, been
commonly used to cover both (1) the first-hand
experience of direct intercourse with God and
(2) the theologicsmetaphysical doctrine of the
soul's possible union with Absolute Reality, i.e.
with God. It would be conducive to clarity to
restrict the word 'mysticism' to the latter significance, namely, as an equivalent for the German
ward Mystik, and as designating the historic
doctrine of the relationship and potential union
of the human soul with Ultimate Reality, and to
use the term 'mystical experience' for direct intercourse with God.
First hand, or mystical, experience is primarily
a psychological question; the doctrine of mysticism is essentially a metaphysical problem."

